Julia Kristeva’s Maternal Passions by Oliver, Kelly
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.172 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 





Julia Kristeva’s Maternal Passions 
Kelly Oliver  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie 
française et de langue française, Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010) pp. 1-8.  
 
Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.172 
http://www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.172 
Julia Kristeva’s Maternal Passions 
Kelly Oliver  
Vanderbilt University 
In “On Femininity,” Sigmund Freud famously asked, “what does a 
woman want?”  His answer, as we know, was a baby, and preferably a male 
baby.  Why?  Because a baby, especially one with a penis, satisfies a 
woman’s penis envy insofar as the baby functions as a substitute for the 
organ she desires yet lacks.  In several of the essays in her recent book Hatred 
and Forgiveness, Julia Kristeva takes up this Freudian question and appears 
to give the same answer: what does a woman want?  She wants a baby.  Yet, 
for Kristeva, the baby is not a substitute penis but rather an antidote to what 
she calls feminine fatigue, which comes from women’s “extraneousness” to, 
and “extravagance” within, the phallic order.  At the same time, however, 
Kristeva reverses the direction of desire from mother to baby and suggests 
that we all want the same thing: What do we want, whether we are women 
or men?  We all want our mommies.  
Women’s étrangeté, foreignness, strangeness, extraneousness and 
extravagance come from the fact that within heteronormative phallocentric 
cultures, they are in the impossible positions of wanting their mommies and 
their daddies in one and the same love object.1  Their desires are extravagant 
because they want it all; they want both sides of the dual universal that is 
humanity.  At the same time, their desires are perversely extraneous to the 
reproduction of the species, which traditionally has been their place in the 
sun.  Kristeva suggests, if does not say, that the cause of both women’s 
extravagance and their extraneousness is their fundamental bisexuality.   
Following Freud, Kristeva identifies two phases of the female Oedipal 
development. What she calls “Oedipal prime” is an attachment to the 
mother that leads to both an identification with the mother and a desire for 
her.  What she calls “Oedipal two” [bis] changes the girl’s love object to the 
father and to the law.  Now, she wants to be the best at following his rules.  
By so doing, she protects her mother/self insofar as the fantasy of the child 
being beaten is not she but rather some bad boy.   
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In This Incredible Need to Believe, Hatred and Forgiveness, and a recent 
lecture, Kristeva rereads Freud’s “A child is being beaten” as not only an 
account of individuation and sexual differentiation, but also of the 
inauguration of human civilization ala Freud’s band of murderous brothers 
in Totem and Taboo.2   She argues that from the perspective of the little girl, 
moving from Oedipal prime to Oedipal two, the girl protects herself from 
incestuous arousal by masochism and then by concentrating on others 
(which, I would say, may amount to the same thing).  For the girl, the 
prototype of the beaten other is the victimized castrated mother (with whom 
she both identifies and refuses identification).  She tries to protect this 
ambivalent object of her affection by looking for others to take her place in 
the beating fantasy, especially boys or men.3   
As Kristeva describes it, in Oedipal two, the little girl displaces her 
incestuous desires for her father (which only barely covers over her desires 
for her mother) onto language and thought.  Kristeva calls this “the 
extravagant capacity of sublimation that all humans possess but which, I, 
little girl, work hard to excel in better than anyone else.”4  We could read 
this as a diagnosis of certain feminist philosophers who set out to prove 
themselves in the world of the father by vigorously protecting the mother 
from victimization by patriarchy.   
I am thinking of my own work, and that of others who revalorize the 
maternal in order to protect it from debasement within phallic culture by 
beating up on their philosophical fathers both to prove that they themselves 
are worthy of the band of brothers and to protect their mothers/themselves 
from victimization by those very brothers, whom they love and yet resent 
because they will someday become the beating, and therefore deserving to 
be beaten, father.  This is not necessarily the agenda of feminists who 
revalue motherhood as a vocation for themselves, so that they can become 
mothers worthy of recognition by mankind.  Rather, these are feminist 
avengers who take on the father/brothers to save the mother whom they 
love, as ambivalent as that love may be due to the abjection of maternity 
within the family of man. Holding onto their bisexual allegiances, they are 
forced to give up having it all, if that means actually having children.  
Perhaps, they are too tired to have children! 
Tired from fighting not only their own extraneousness to the phallic 
order but also the victimization of their beloved mothers, it would make 
sense that they suffer from “feminine fatigue.”  Kristeva describes this 
feminine fatigue as the result of a bisexuality that hasn’t been worked 
through.  Unable to choose between mother and father, to take sides once 
and for all, this woman is exhausted from walking the fence.  She wants to 
please her father and that is why she excels at his game, although she uses it 
against him to defend her mother, even if she is what Kristeva calls a “crazy 
mother.”  “We are not all psychotic,” says Kristeva, “but we can all be crazy.  
Crazy for one another (men and women, women and women, men and men) 
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because we are crazy for our crazy mothers.”5  It turns out, however, that 
some of us are crazier than others for those crazy mothers!  Too invested in 
pleasing the father with our intellectual pursuits to be her, yet too loyal to 
her craziness, to her depression, to be him.  Confused about who to be and 
therefore about who to love.  Wanting to be everything and to love and be 
loved by everybody, an extravagant and ultimately exhausting desire.   
Kristeva imagines a “cure” for feminine fatigue in motherhood.  She 
maintains that woman’s extraneousness or strangeness to the symbolic order 
is manifested in a specific way during pregnancy and motherhood, 
particularly in the mother’s relation to the infant.6  And pregnancy and 
motherhood are ways of working through the passion that makes us 
speaking beings, the passion that makes us human rather than animals.  
Maternal passion, she argues, is a prototype of all human passion.   
Following Jean-Didier Vincent, she defines passion as specific to man in 
that it requires reflexive consciousness and the capacity for encountering the 
other.  Passion is the crossroads or interface between emotions, which are 
bodily or somatic and shared by all vertebrates, and reflexive consciousness, 
which is the result of both the symbolic pact that founds human civilization 
(that is to say the murder of the father and substitution of the totemic 
animal) and the formation of the unconscious as a result of the repression of 
this criminal act upon which the pact originates.   
Of course, Kristeva’s rereading of Totem and Taboo complicates Freud’s 
story.  In Powers of Horror, she emphasizes the brothers’ incestuous desires 
for the mother; in Sense and Nonsense of the Revolt, she emphasizes the 
pleasure in the totemic feast that operates as counterbalance to the horror 
and guilt; in her recent work, This Incredible Need to Believe, she emphasizes 
the incestuous desire for, and identification with, the suffering father, the 
father is being beaten to death).  For Kristeva, even when it is about the 
father, it is also and always about the mother and the pleasures and horrors 
of her body.  This is why maternal passion is a prototype of passion from the 
side of the child, the father, and the other more generally.  But, it is from the 
side of the mother herself that Kristeva locates the essence of human 
passion.   
In a chapter of Hatred and Forgiveness entitled “The Passion According to 
Motherhood,” she says, “allow me to take the mother’s side” and proceeds 
to describe “the extraneousness of the pregnant woman” as the narcissistic 
withdrawal wherein “the future mother becomes an object of desire, 
pleasure and aversion for herself.”  In this state, which Kristeva claims is not 
unlike “possession,” the pregnant woman is “incapable of taking into 
account an existence separate from her own.”7 She is completely absorbed 
by emotions invested in her own body as the “hollow” habitation of a future 
love-object that she will have to allow to become a subject.  Here is how 
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Kristeva describes this maternal progression toward what she calls the 
“miracle” of love: 
[It] begins by the passion of the pregnant woman for 
herself: her destabilized “self,” a loss of identity, because 
divided by the intervention of the lover-father, and, 
through this intervention of the other, inhabited by an 
unknown third party—an embryo, a fetus, then a baby, a 
child, though for the moment an indiscernible 
double…This first stage of the passion turned within is 
followed by the mother’s passion for the new subject that 
will be her child, provided he/she ceases to be her double, 
but from whom the mother detaches herself to allow the 
child to become an autonomous being. This motion of 
expulsion, of detachment, is essential. Thus, the negative 
immediately inhabits maternal passion.8  
This move from self-absorption to love of the child and then eventually 
release or weaning of the child is the “miracle” of maternal passion because 
the mother embodies both passion and dispassion, or passion and working-
through passion.  On Kristeva’s account, then, it is not primarily passion that 
is uniquely human but rather dispassion or the sublimation of passion, 
which is essential to maternal passion as successful mothering.  She 
describes the “miracle”: 
Miraculously (“miraculously,” because even though it 
seems impossible, this alchemy manages to take place, and 
consequently, humanity exists, thinks, speaks, lives), 
motherhood is a passion in the sense that the emotions of 
narcissistic attachment and aggressiveness, filtered 
through reflexive consciousness and through the 
unconscious that speaks of Eros and Thanatos, are 
transformed into love (with its more or less attenuated 
correlate of hate). I would even say that in this experience 
of motherhood, passion takes on its most human aspect, 
which is to say, the furthest from its biological foundation, 
which nevertheless accompanies it (the famous drives of 
attachment and aggressiveness), and that it takes the path 
of sublimation without ceasing to be a passion. … 
“It is in motherhood that the link to the other can become 
love…” 9 
Several features of Kristeva’s account are particularly noteworthy.  First, 
she describes pregnancy and motherhood as the most human activity insofar 
as it is the furthest from mere biological functioning.  Clearly, this claim is 
antithetical to traditional views of women’s role in reproduction, which, as 
we know, has been and continues to be seen as a matter of biology, even 
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animality.  And while it is akin to de Beauvoir’s suggestion in The Second Sex 
that human females are more oppressed by their relation to reproduction 
than female animals because they can reflect on the experience, Kristeva, 
unlike Beauvoir, valorizes maternity.   
Second, maternal passion is quintessential to human passion because it 
can be a form of working through conflicting emotions of attraction and 
aversion, which are the result of animal drives, by turning them into the 
human passions of love and hate.  On this account, animals are incapable of 
love and hate because these so-called feelings require reflexive 
consciousness and expression in language and therefore go beyond mere 
feelings in the technical sense in which emotions are opposed to passions.  
Third, the transformation of emotion or bodily drive into passion or 
sublimated drive is only the beginning of maternal passion.  Its telos is the 
detachment or dispassion required for weaning the child and helping it 
become autonomous.  And this simultaneous holding onto and pushing 
away is what is truly distinctive about human passion, embodied most 
dramatically and dynamically in maternal passion.  This is why, here, 
Kristeva says that there is no good mother except the one who lends herself 
to matricide, echoing her earlier provocation from Black Sun, “matricide is 
our vital necessity.”10  She also claims that the good enough mother loves no 
one because her passion is eclipsed by her detachment, which leads to her 
“serenity.”   
Fourth, this so-called serenity, like the good enough mother, also may 
be an impossibility, which is why we end up with crazy mothers.  Indeed, 
how can loving passionately, and then sacrificing that love for the sake of a 
society that demands your own symbolic death, not make you mad, if not a 
little crazy?   
Fifth, Kristeva argues that without motherhood, women remain 
extraneous and therefore most likely paranoid or hysterical or both.  She 
maintains: “Human history since the last glacial period has found two 
‘natural’ solutions to allow this grueling path (Oedipal prime + Oedipal 
two)—which society requires the female subject to realize somehow—to end 
in plasticity rather than collapse: there are motherhood and hysteria.”11 
 In addition, Kristeva argues that without working through both 
Oedipal phases, women cannot have fulfilling relations with others:  
“Taking into account the feminine extraneousness to the symbolic order, I 
think that without an optimal experience of motherhood, the female subject has 
difficulty attaining—and perhaps never attains—a relationship to the other 
sex, or a relationship to the other, whatever it is, that is not pure emotion 
(attachment/adversity) or pure indifference.”  Yet, Kristeva claims that 
analysis can perform the same structural modifications of optimal 
motherhood:  “I said: without a relationship to maternal passion, it being 
understood that motherhood is a biological and symbolic process and that 
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analytical, self-analytical, or sublimatory work can arrive at the same 
structural modifications. I am emphasizing the structural experience of 
motherhood: I am not fundamentally ‘pro-birth’.”12  
There is something about the structure of motherhood, then, that can be 
emulated in analysis, something that can move the woman through the 
borderline state that is her inherent bisexuality and becomes explicit in 
pregnancy, toward “serenity.”  This serenity, which may seem to echo 
Freud’s oceanic feeling, from the side of the pregnant woman, actually 
explodes the illusion of oneness and wholeness in order to love passionately 
and yet let go of that love to embrace life.  Like childbirth, analysis (and 
writing, art and mysticism) can bring “a time of new beginnings and rebirths 
and a certain serenity.”   
But, it is not just the mother’s relationship with the child that makes 
motherhood transformative.  In addition, it is the woman’s relationship with 
her own mother through her experience of childbirth and motherhood that 
makes motherhood one way of dealing with the fundamental bisexuality of 
the bivalent female Oedipal complex.  Through motherhood, a woman 
identifies with her mother and re-fuses that incestuous bond in a socially 
acceptable way.  In addition, she returns to her own childhood and 
“unconsciously relearns her mother tongue” by teaching her child to speak.  
She thereby revises not only her relation to her mother, but also her relation 
to language.  Rather, than find her self extraneous to the phallic order, as a 
mother teaching her child to speak, she is essential to it.  Through the baby 
talk she shares with her infant, she reconnects words, affects, and bodily 
sensations, which also reconnect her with a “lost time,” the time of infancy, 
the time of Oedipus prime.13  Baby talk is a “sensorial language” that allows 
the mother to find “the conjunction of her symbolic and carnal essences.”14 
Baby talk remains symbolic even while foregrounding the semiotic element 
of language, particularly as it relates to the relationship between the 
maternal body and the infant, and maternal body and the lost time of her 
loving bond with another woman’s body.  
Thus, Kristeva concludes: “the very structure of maternal experience 
favors this metabolism of passion into dispassion” through the place of the 
father, time, and the acquisition of language, all three of which provide the 
distance necessary for detachment required for turning passion into 
dispassion.15  In a sense, then, motherhood and analysis share the same goal, 
namely, to turn passion into dispassion through sublimation.  We need to 
give up love, or at least distance ourselves from it, in order to find it beyond 
craziness and in serenity.  Alluding to Colette, Kristeva reassures us that 
“The dispassionate humanity reborn from this experience would not 
necessarily be boring or robotic.  Perhaps it would simply have a gay, 
varied, and plentiful lucidity.  And it would preserve the laughter of love: to 
the point of making light of love itself…”16 In her earlier work on female 
genius, Kristeva suggests that perhaps motherhood is the antidote to the 
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increasing atomization of human experience insofar as maternal creativity 
engenders human individuals through both nature and nurture. 
In “Fatigue in the Feminine,” she compares this creative mother to a 
“good fairy”: “Nothing is impossible for a mother who succeeds at her 
psychical bisexuality: a tireless ‘good fairy’, she does not notice that she is 
depleted in the small cares lavished on her loved ones.”  It seems, then, that 
motherhood is a strange antidote to both feminine fatigue and hysteria, 
insofar as the woman is exhausted and perhaps even sick, but doesn’t notice.  
Kristeva gives the example of a woman who was taking care of her mother 
who had Alzheimer’s and her son who was operated on for a brain tumor, 
who was so busy taking care of others that when she fell and broke her 
ankle she felt no pain or fatigue.17  
At this point, we may wonder whether this tireless good fairy is just 
another form of maternal sacrifice and why Kristeva embraces this model so 
familiar to us from cultural stereotypes of the good mother, who sacrifices 
herself for her children.  Perhaps, this good fairy mother is the one who 
needs to be weaned, not only for the sake of her children’s autonomy, but 
also for the sake of her own.  After all, Kristeva does insist that it is through 
not only her passion but also her dispassion that the mother can be a model 
for human passion at its best.   
Kristeva suggests that like Colette’s mother Sido, the ideal mother has 
to turn away from her children to tend her own flowers, so that she too can 
bloom.18 Describing writing as another antidote to feminine fatigue, and 
Colette’s writing in particular, Kristeva says “No fatigue in this writing, 
through which a gigantic feminine Self loves itself in the French language 
(for the first and last time?), Sido’s maternal language, consuming flora and 
fauna, cacti and cats, the dimensions of the universe.  Flowering, continual 
rebirth.”19 Leaving aside her troubling reliance on the actuality of pregnancy 
and the activity of mothering, Kristeva suggests that the structure of 
motherhood, like the structure of writing, art and analysis, is not primarily 
about giving birth but about rebirth, and the cyclical time of flowering and 
dying off necessary for life.   
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